Adaptive Detection of Coherent Radar Targets in the Presence of Noise
  Jamming by Addabbo, Pia et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
3.
03
54
7v
1 
 [e
es
s.S
P]
  8
 M
ar 
20
19
1
Adaptive Detection of Coherent Radar Targets in
the Presence of Noise Jamming
Pia Addabbo, Member, IEEE, Olivier Besson,
Danilo Orlando, Senior Member, IEEE, and Giuseppe Ricci, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we devise adaptive decision schemes
to detect targets competing against clutter and smart noise-like
jammers (NLJ) which illuminate the radar system from the
sidelobes. Specifically, the considered class of NLJs generates
a pulse of noise (noise cover pulse) that is triggered by and
concurrent with the received uncompressed pulse in order to
mask the skin echo and, hence, to hide the true target range. The
detection problem is formulated as a binary hypothesis test and
two different models for the NLJ are considered. Then, ad hoc
modifications of the generalized likelihood ratio test are exploited
where the unknown parameters are estimated by means of cyclic
optimization procedures. The performance analysis is carried out
using simulated data and proves the effectiveness of the proposed
approach for both situations where the NLJ is either active or
switched off.
Index Terms—Adaptive radar detection, alternating estima-
tion, generalized likelihood ratio test, electronic countermeasure,
electronic counter-countermeasures, noise cover pulse, noise-like
jammers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic countermeasures (ECMs) are active techniques
aimed at protecting a platform from being detected and
tracked by the radar [1]. This is accomplished through two
approaches: masking and deception. Noncoherent jammers or
noise-like jammers (NLJs) attempt to mask targets generating
nondeceptive interference which blends into the thermal noise
of the radar receiver. As a consequence, the radar sensitivity
is degraded due to the increase of the constant false alarm
rate threshold which adapts to the higher level of noise [1],
[2]. In addition, this increase makes more difficult to discover
that jamming is taking place [3], [4]. On the other hand,
the coherent jammers (CJs) transmit low-duty cycle signals
intended to inject false information into the radar processor.
Specifically, they are capable of receiving, modifying, ampli-
fying, and retransmitting the radar’s own signal to create false
targets maintaining radar’s range, Doppler, and angle far away
from the true position of the platform under protection [1]–[3],
[5].
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Nowadays, radar designers have developed defense strate-
gies referred to as electronic counter-countermeasures (EC-
CMs) which are aimed at countering the effects of the enemy’s
ECM and eventually succeeding in the intended mission. Such
techniques can be categorized as antenna-related, transmitter-
related, receiver-related, and signal-processing-related depend-
ing on the main radar subsystem where they take place [3]. The
reader is referred to [3, and references therein] for a detailed
description of the major ECCM techniques.
The first line of defense against jamming is represented
by the radar antenna, whose beampattern can be suitably
exploited and/or shaped to eliminate sidelobe false targets or
to attenuate the power of NLJs entering from the antenna
sidelobes. In this context, famous antenna-related techniques
capable of preventing jamming signals from entering through
the radar sidelobes are the so-called sidelobe blanking (SLB)
and sidelobe canceling (SLC) [6]. In particular, suppression of
NLJs can be accomplished via an SLC system. SLC uses an
array of auxiliary antennas to adaptively estimate the direction
of arrival and the power of the jammers and, subsequently, to
modify the receiving pattern of the radar antenna placing nulls
in the jammers’ directions. SLB and SLC can be jointly used
to face with NLJs and CJs contemporaneously impinging on
the sidelobes of the victim radar [7]. In [6] it is also shown
that a data dependent threshold, based on [8], outperforms a
cascade of SLC and SLB stages. The detector proposed in
[8] is a special case of the more general class of tunable
(possibly space-time) detectors which have been shown to be
an effective means to attack detection of mainlobe targets or
rejection of CJs notwithstanding the presence of NLJs and
clutter [8]-[20]. As a matter of fact, such solutions can be
viewed as signal-processing-related ECCMs. A way to design
tunable receivers relies on the so-called two-stage architecture;
such schemes are formed by cascading two detectors (usually
with opposite behaviors in terms of selectivity): the overall
one declares the presence of a target in the cell under test only
when data survive both detection thresholdings [9]-[12], [16]-
[20]. Such detectors can also be used as classifiers: in this case,
the first stage is less selective than the second one and it is used
to discriminate between the null hypothesis and the alternative
that a structured signal is present. In case of detection, the
second stage is aimed at discrimination between mainlobe and
sidelobe signals, as explicitly shown in [17] for the adaptive
sidelobe blanker (ASB). Adaptive detection and discrimination
between useful signals and CJs in the presence of thermal
noise, clutter, and possible NLJ has also been addressed in
[21]. Therein the CJ is assumed to belong to the orthogonal
2complement of the space spanned by the nominal steering
vector (after whitening by the true covariance matrix of the
composite disturbance). This approach, based on a modified
adaptive beamformer orthogonal rejection test (ABORT), see
also [20], [22], allows to investigate the discrimination capabil-
ities of adaptive arrays when the CJ is not necessarily confined
to the “sidelobe beam pattern,” but might also be a mainlobe
deception jammer. A network of radars can be exploited to
combat ECM signals. In this case, it is reasonable that, for a
given CUT, only a subset of the radars receives ECM signals
(CJs) as considered in [23].
Herein, we address adaptive detection in presence of noise
cover pulse (NCP) jamming. The NCP is an ECM technique
belonging to the class of noise-like jamming. Specifically, this
kind of ECM generates a pulse of noise that is triggered by
and concurrent with the received uncompressed pulse (see
Figure 1). To this end, several received radar pulses are used
to estimate the pulse width (PW) and the pulse repetition
interval (PRI) to predict the arrival time instant of the next
pulse of the victim radar. The transmitted noise power is strong
enough to mask the skin echo even after the radar performs
the pulse compression, which is used to enhance the range
resolution. It follows that, since the length of the transmitted
pulse is much higher than the duration of a range bin, the
NCP creates an extended-range return spread over many range
bins that hides the true target range. Thus, it becomes of
vital importance for a radar system to counteract the effects
of an NCP attack. An ECCM technique against NCP is
represented by the cover pulse channel (CPC) [24], which
consists in using an auxiliary physical channel to track the
NCP transmission rather than the skin return from the target.
The main drawbacks of this technique are the degradation of
the high-range resolution associated with the narrow pulses
which result from the compression process and the exploitation
of additional hardware resources. In order to overcome such
limitations, in this paper we devise a signal-processing-related
ECCM capable of detecting targets which compete against
a NCP, while satisfying the original system requirements on
range resolution. Besides, the proposed solution by its nature
can reside in the signal processing unit of the system without
the need of additional hardware. From a mathematical point
of view, we formulate the detection problem as a binary
hypothesis test where primary data (namely those containing
target returns) are formed by a set of range bins which is
representative of the uncompressed pulse length and such that
target return is located in only one bin whereas all the primary
range bins are contaminated by the NCP. As for the NCP, we
consider two models. In the first case, the NCP is represented
as a rank-one modification of the interference covariance
matrix (ICM), while in the second case the presence of the
NCP is accounted for by including a deterministic structured
component in all the range bins. Moreover, we assume that
a set of training samples are available to estimate the clutter
and noise components of the ICM. These data are collected
using a suitable number of guard cells surrounding those under
test and related to the uncompressed pulse length. Then, we
derive adaptive architectures exploiting ad hoc modifications
of the generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) design criterion
where the unknown parameters are estimated resorting to
an alternating procedure. Specifically, we leverage the cyclic
optimization paradigm described in [25]. Finally, we present
numerical examples which highlight the effectiveness of the
proposed solutions also in comparison with existing archi-
tectures which are somehow compatible with the considered
problem.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: next
section is devoted to the problem formulation and to the
description of the two different models for the NCP. Section III
contains the derivation of the detection architectures, whereas
Section IV provides the performance assessment of the detec-
tors (also in comparison to natural competitors). Concluding
remarks and future research tracks are given in Section V.
A. Notation
In the sequel, vectors and matrices are denoted by boldface
lower-case and upper-case letters, respectively. The symbols
det(·), Tr (·), etr {·}, (·)∗, (·)T , (·)† denote the determinant,
trace, exponential of the trace, complex conjugate, transpose,
and conjugate transpose, respectively. As to numerical sets, R
is the set of real numbers, RN×M is the Euclidean space of
(N ×M)-dimensional real matrices (or vectors if M = 1), C
is the set of complex numbers, and CN×M is the Euclidean
space of (N ×M)-dimensional complex matrices (or vectors
if M = 1). The symbols ℜ{z} and ℑ{z} indicate the real
and imaginary parts of the complex number z, respectively.
IN stands for the N ×N identity matrix, while 0 is the null
vector or matrix of proper dimensions. Let f(x) ∈ RN×1 be
a scalar-valued function of vector argument, then ∂f(x)/∂x
denotes the gradient of f(·) with respect to x arranged in a
column vector. The Euclidean norm of a vector is denoted
by ‖ · ‖. The (k, l)-entry (or l-entry) of a generic matrix A
(or vector a) is denoted by A(k, l) (or a(l)). The acronym
IID means independent and identically distributed while the
symbol E[·] denotes statistical expectation. Finally, we write
x ∼ CNN (m,M) if x is an N -dimensional complex normal
vector with mean m and positive definite covariance matrix
M .
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Assume that the radar is equipped with a linear array
formed by N antennas to sense the environment. For each
sensor, the incoming signal is downconverted to baseband
and, then, convolved with a conjugate time-reversed copy of
the transmitted waveform (matched filter). The output of this
filter is sampled to form the range bins of the area under
surveillance. Thus, each range bin is represented by an N -
dimensional complex vector. In what follows, we assume that
the signal received from the cell under test (CUT) can be
interference only, i.e., thermal noise, clutter, and a possible
NCP jamming, or a noisy version of the signal backscattered
by a coherent target.
As stated in Section I, the NCP is an ECM technique
belonging to the class of noise-like jamming. Commonly, on
the radar side, the action of the NCP jammer leads to an
3increase of the noise level over many range bins hiding the
true target range.
In order to model this situation, we denote by i¯ the integer
indexing the CUT and by Ω = {i¯ − H1, . . . , i¯ + H2} a set
of integers indexing the range bins contaminated by the NCP
jammer which also include the CUT. The number of range bins
after and before the CUT that are contaminated by the NCP
jammer is not necessarily the same due to possible uncertainty
in the PW and PRI estimates. Moreover, such parameters are
not known at the radar receiver, but an educated guess is
possible. Thus, in the following we do not address the problem
of determining H1 and H2, but assume that H1 and H2 and,
hence, H = H1 +H2 + 1, the number of contaminated cells,
is known. Additionally, we assume that a set of K ≥ N
secondary data, representative of thermal noise plus clutter
only, is collected by the radar using a number of guard cells
reflecting the length of the uncompressed pulse (see Figure 2).
With the above model in mind, denote by z i¯ ∈ CN×1,
zi ∈ CN×1 with i ∈ Ω \ {i¯}, and rk ∈ CN×1 with
k = 1, . . . ,K , the vector containing the returns from the
CUT, the vectors contaminated by NCP jammer, but free
of target components, and the secondary data, respectively.
For further developments we assume that such vectors are
statistically independent. Then, the problem of detecting the
possible presence of a coherent return from a given cell is
formulated in terms of the following hypothesis test
H0 :

zi¯ ∼ CNN
(
0,M + qq†
)
,
zi ∼ CNN
(
0,M + qq†
)
, i ∈ Ω \ {i¯},
rk ∼ CNN (0,M) , k = 1, . . . ,K,
H1 :

zi¯ ∼ CNN
(
αv(θT ),M + qq
†) ,
zi ∼ CNN
(
0,M + qq†
)
, i ∈ Ω \ {i¯},
rk ∼ CNN (0,M) , k = 1, . . . ,K,
(1)
where
• α ∈ C is an unknown deterministic factor accounting for
target response and channel effects;
• v(θT ) = 1√N
[
1 ejpi sin(θT ) . . . ejpi(N−1) sin(θT )
]T ∈
CN×1 is the known steering vector of the target with
θT the angle of arrival of the target
1; in the following,
for brevity, we omit the dependence of v on θT .
• M ∈ CN×N is the unknown positive definite covariance
matrix of thermal noise plus clutter;
• q ∈ CN×1 is an unknown vector representing the
contribution to the noise covariance matrix of the NCP
jamming.
Some definitions that will be used in the next develop-
ments for problem (1) are now in order. Let ZΩ,¯i =
[z i¯−H1 · · · zi¯−1 zi¯+1 · · ·z i¯+H2 ], Zα,¯i =
[
zα,¯i ZΩ,¯i
]
with
zα,¯i = z i¯ − αv, and Z i¯ =
[
z i¯ ZΩ,¯i
]
. Then, the probability
density functions (PDFs) of Z i¯ under H0 and H1 are given
by
f0(Z i¯; q,M)
= 1
[piN det(M+qq†)]
H etr
{
− (M + qq†)−1Z i¯Z†i¯} (2)
1Note that the steering corresponds to a uniform linear array with half-
wavelength spacing.
and
f1(Z i¯;α, q,M)
= 1
[piN det(M+qq†)]
H etr
{
− (M + qq†)−1Zα,¯iZ†α,¯i} ,
(3)
respectively, whereas the PDF of R = [r1 · · · rK ] under both
hypotheses has the following expression
f(R;M) =
1
[πN det (M)]
K
etr
{
−M−1RR†
}
. (4)
Finally, let us define the likelihood function of the unknown
parameters under Hi, i = 0, 1, as
L0(q,M) = f0(z i¯,ZΩ,¯i; q,M), (5)
L1(α, q,M) = f1(z i¯,ZΩ,¯i;α, q,M). (6)
Now, we formulate the detection problem from another per-
spective. Specifically, observe that the radar system, at each
dwell, collects a realization of the NCP. Thus, it is reasonable
to compare (1) with another detection problem formulated as
H0 :

z i¯ ∼ CNN (βq,M ) ,
zi ∼ CNN (βiq,M) , i ∈ Ω \ {i¯},
rk ∼ CNN (0,M) , k = 1, . . . ,K,
H1 :
 z i¯ ∼ CNN (αv + βq,M ) ,zi ∼ CNN (βiq,M) , i ∈ Ω \ {i¯},
rk ∼ CNN (0,M) , k = 1, . . . ,K,
(7)
where
• β ∈ C and βi ∈ C are unknown deterministic factors
representative of the different jammer amplitudes;
• q ∈ CN×1 is an unknown deterministic vector represent-
ing the contribution of the NCP jamming.
Again, we have that
• α ∈ C is an unknown deterministic factor accounting for
target response and channel effects;
• v ∈ CN×1 is the known steering vector of the target;
• M ∈ CN×N is the unknown positive definite covariance
matrix of thermal noise plus clutter.
Furthermore, in this case, the PDF of Z i¯, under Hl, l = 0, 1,
exhibits the following expression
f(zi¯,ZΩ,¯i; lα, β, βi, i ∈ Ω \ {i¯},M , q) =
1
[πN det(M)]
H
exp
{
−Tr
[
M−1
(
(z i¯ − lαv − βq)(z i¯ − lαv − βq)†
+
∑
i∈Ω\{i¯}
(zi − βiq)(zi − βiq)†
)]}
, (8)
while the likelihood functions under Hl, l = 0, 1, are given by
L0(β, βi, i ∈ Ω \ {i¯},M , q)
= f(z i¯,ZΩ,¯i; 0, β, βi, i ∈ Ω \ {i¯},M , q),
L1(α, β, βi, i ∈ Ω \ {i¯},M , q)
= f(z i¯,ZΩ,¯i;α, β, βi, i ∈ Ω \ {i¯},M , q).
(9)
4III. DETECTOR DESIGNS
In this section, we device adaptive decision schemes for
problems (1) and (7). To this end, observe that we cannot
apply the Neyman-Pearson criterion since parameters α, β,
βi, M and q are not known. For this reason, we have to
resort to ad hoc solutions. In particular, we adopt the two-
step GLRT-based design procedure: first we derive the GLRT
for known M ; then we obtain an adaptive detector replacing
the unknown matrix M with an estimate based on secondary
data. Thus, the main problem to solve is to discriminate
between the interference-only-hypothesis H0 and the signal-
plus-interference-hypothesis H1 based on z i¯ and ZΩ,¯i only
(for known M ).
A. An adaptive architecture for problem (1)
The GLRT for known M is given by
max
α,q
L1(α, q,M)
max
q
L0(q,M)
H1
>
<
H0
η, (10)
where η is the threshold2 to be set according to the desired
value of the probability of false alarm (Pfa).
Maximization of the PDF under H0 can be conducted using
the following identities
det
(
M + qq†
)
=det (M) det
(
IN +M
−1/2qq†M−1/2
)
=det (M)
(
1 + u†u
)
, (11)
where u =M−1/2q and
Tr
[(
M + qq†
)−1
Z i¯Z
†
i¯
]
= Tr
[
M−1/2
(
I + uu†
)−1
X i¯Z
†
i¯
]
= Tr
[(
I + uu†
)−1
X i¯X
†
i¯
]
= Tr
[
X i¯X
†
i¯
− uu
†
1 + u†u
X i¯X
†
i¯
]
(12)
where the last equality in equation (12) is obtained using
the matrix inversion lemma while X i¯ = M
−1/2Z i¯ =
M−1/2
[
z i¯ ZΩ,¯i
]
= [xi¯ XΩ,¯i]. Maximization under the H1
hypothesis is conducted using identity (11), but replacing (12)
with
Tr
[(
M + qq†
)−1
Zα,¯iZ
†
α,¯i
]
= Tr
[
Xα,¯iX
†
α,¯i
− uu
†
1 + u†u
Xα,¯iX
†
α,¯i
]
where Xα,¯i = M
−1/2Zα,¯i = [xα,¯i XΩ,¯i] and, in particular,
xα,¯i = M
−1/2 (z i¯ − αv). It follows that the likelihood
functions under H0 and H1 can be re-written as
L0(q,M) =
1
[piN det(M )(1+u†u)]
H
×etr
{
−X i¯X†i¯ +
uu†
1 + u†u
X i¯X
†
i¯
}
(13)
2Hereafter, η denotes any modification of the original threshold.
and
L1(α, q,M) =
1
[piN det(M)(1+u†u)]
H
×etr
{
−Xα,¯iX†α,¯i +
uu†
1 + u†u
Xα,¯iX
†
α,¯i
}
,
(14)
respectively.
Now, we focus on the maximization of the PDF under H0.
To this end, observe that u can be represented as u =
√
pu0
with p = u†u = ‖u‖2 > 0 and, hence, ‖u0‖ = 1. For future
reference, we also define by S the N -sphere centered at the
origin with unit radius; thus, condition u
†
0u0 = ‖u0‖2 = 1 is
equivalent to u0 ∈ S.
It follows that
max
q
L0(q,M) =
1
[πN det (M)]
H
etr
{
−X i¯X†i¯
}
× max
u0,p
1
(1 + p)
H
etr
{
pu0u
†
0
1 + p
X i¯X
†
i¯
}
.
Thus, for known u0, maximizing L0 with respect to p is
tantamount to maximizing
g(p) =
1
(1 + p)H
exp
{
p
1 + p
u
†
0X i¯X
†
i¯
u0
}
(15)
with respect to p ≥ 0. It can be shown that the maximum is
attained at
p̂ =
 u
†
0X i¯X
†
i¯
u0
H
− 1, if u
†
0X i¯X
†
i¯
u0
H
> 1,
0, otherwise,
(16)
and is given by
maxp≥0 g(p)
=

[
H
u
†
0X i¯X
†
i¯
u0
]H
exp{u†0X i¯X†i¯u0 −H}, if
u
†
0X i¯X
†
i¯
u0
H
>1,
1, otherwise.
(17)
Now, we let
h(x) =

[
H
x
]H
ex−H , x ∈ (H,+∞),
1, x ∈ [0, H ],
and observe that it is a strictly increasing function of x
over [H,+∞) (and constant over [0, H ]). It follows that to
maximize L0 with respect to u it is sufficient to plug the
maximizer of u
†
0X i¯X
†
i¯
u0 with respect to u0 into max
p≥0
g(p).
Using the Rayleigh-Ritz theorem [26], we obtain
max
u0∈S
u
†
0X i¯X
†
i¯
u0 = λ1
(
X i¯X
†
i¯
)
, (18)
where λ1 (·) denotes the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix
argument and a maximizer for u0 is a normalized eigenvector
5of the matrixX i¯X
†
i¯
corresponding to λ1
(
X i¯X
†
i¯
)
. Thus, we
can conclude that
max
q
L0(q,M) =
1
[πN det (M)]
H
etr
{
−X i¯X†i¯
}
×

 H
λ1
(
X i¯X
†
i¯
)
Hexp{λ1(X i¯X†i¯)−H}, if λ1
(
X i¯X
†
i¯
)
H
>1,
1, otherwise.
(19)
As for the optimization problem under H1, let us compute
the logarithm of the likelihood function (14) neglecting the
terms independent of α and u to obtain
g(α, p,u0) =−H log(1 + u†u)
− Tr
[(
IN − uu
†
1 + u†u
)
SΩ,¯i
]
− Tr
[(
IN − uu
†
1 + u†u
)
Sα,¯i
]
=−H log(1 + u†u) + u
†SΩ,¯iu
1 + u†u
+
∣∣∣x†α,¯iu∣∣∣2
1 + u†u
− x†
α,¯i
xα,¯i − Tr
[
SΩ,¯i
]
=−H log(1 + p) + p
1 + p
u
†
0SΩ,¯iu0
+
p
1 + p
|x†
α,¯i
u0|2 − x†α,¯ixα,¯i − Tr
[
SΩ,¯i
]
,
(20)
where SΩ,¯i =XΩ,¯iX
†
Ω,¯i
and Sα,¯i = xα,¯ix
†
α,¯i
.
It follows that maximizing L1(α, q,M) with respect to α
and q is tantamount to
max
α,p,u0
g(α, p,u0). (21)
However, this joint maximization with respect to α, p, and
u0 is not an analytically tractable problem at least to the
best of authors’ knowledge. For this reason, we resort to
a suboptimum approach relying on alternating maximization
[25]. Specifically, let us assume that u0 = u
(n)
0 and p = p
(n)
are known, then it is not difficult to show that
α(n) = argmax
α
g
(
α, p(n),u
(n)
0
)
= argmin
α
x
†
α,¯i
[
IN − p
(n)
1 + p(n)
u
(n)
0 (u
(n)
0 )
†
]
xα,¯i
=
v
†
0
[
IN − p
(n)
1 + p(n)
u
(n)
0 (u
(n)
0 )
†
]
xi¯
v
†
0
[
IN − p
(n)
1 + p(n)
u
(n)
0 (u
(n)
0 )
†
]
v0
, (22)
where v0 = M
−1/2v. Now, let us exploit α(n) to estimate
u0 and p, namely to solve the problem
max
p,u0∈S
g
(
α(n), p,u0
)
. (23)
To this end, following the same line of reasoning as for H0,
we obtain that[
p(n+1)
u
(n+1)
0
]
= arg max
p,u0∈S
g
(
α(n), p,u0
)
=
[
max{λ1(SΩ,¯i + xα(n) ,¯ix†α(n) ,¯i)/H − 1, 0}
b1
]
,
(24)
where we remember that λ1(·) is the maximum eigenvalue of
the matrix argument, xα(n) ,¯i is obtained replacing α with α
(n)
in xα,¯i, and b1 is a normalized eigenvector corresponding to
λ1(SΩ,¯i + xα(n) ,¯ix
†
α(n) ,¯i
).
Iterating the above estimation procedure, we come up with
the following nondecreasing sequence
L1(α
(0), q(0),M) ≤ L1(α(0), q(1),M)
≤ L1(α(1), q(1),M) ≤ . . . ≤ L1(α(n), q(n),M), (25)
where we start using for q(0) a normalized steering vector from
a sidelobe direction and q(i) = p(i)M1/2u
(i)
0 , i = 1, . . . , n.
Since the likelihood under H1 is bounded from the above with
respect to α, p, u0, the nondecreasing sequence (25) converges
as n diverges and, hence, a suitable stopping criterion can
be defined. For example, a possible strategy might consist in
continuing the procedure until
‖q(n) − q(n−1)‖ < ǫq and/or |α(n) − α(n−1)| < ǫα. (26)
Another approach might be that the alternating procedure ter-
minates when n > Nmax with Nmax the maximum allowable
number of iterations. We will use the latter stopping criterion
with Nmax chosen in the next section.
To prove that the likelihood is bounded from the above,
we re-write g as the sum of three (bounded above) functions,
namely as
g(α, p,u0) =−H log(1 + p) + p
1 + p
u
†
0SΩ,¯iu0
+
p
1 + p
|x†
α,¯i
u0|2 − x†α,¯ixα,¯i
=g1(p) + g2(p,u0) + g3(α, p,u0) (27)
with
g1(p) = −H log(1 + p)− Tr
[
SΩ,¯i
]
, (28)
g2(p,u0) =
p
1 + p
u
†
0SΩ,¯iu0, (29)
g3(α, p,u0) =
p
1 + p
|x†
α,¯i
u0|2 − x†α,¯ixα,¯i. (30)
Then, it is sufficient to observe that
• g1(p) ≤ 0, ∀p ≥ 0;
• ∀p ≥ 0,u0 ∈ S the second term g2(p,u0) can be trivially
upperbounded as
g2(p,u0) =
p
1 + p
u
†
0SΩ,¯iu0
≤ u†0SΩ,¯iu0(≤ λ1(SΩ,¯i)) (31)
and the right-most hand side attains a maximum since it
is a continuous function of u0 over a compact set (u0
belongs to the N -sphere with unit radius);
6• the third term can be re-written as
g3(α, p,u0) = −x†α,¯i
(
IN − p
1 + p
u0u
†
0
)
xα,¯i;
since the matrix IN − p1+pu0u†0 is positive definite ∀p ≥
0 and u0 ∈ S, it follows that g3(α, p,u0) ≤ 0, ∀α ∈
C, p ≥ 0,u0 ∈ S.
Finally, M can be estimated using secondary data R as
M̂ =
1
K
RR†. (32)
This decision scheme is referred to in the following as random
NCP detector (R-NCP-D).
B. An adaptive architecture for problem (7)
In this case, the GLRT for known M is given by
max
α,β,βi,i∈Ω\{i¯},q
L1(α, β, βi, i ∈ Ω \ {i¯},M , q)
max
β,βi,i∈Ω\{i¯},q
L0(β, βi, i ∈ Ω \ {i¯},M , q)
H1
>
<
H0
η. (33)
Focusing on the maximization of the PDF under H0, we
observe that maximizing L0 is tantamount to maximizing
w(β, βi, i ∈ Ω \ {i¯}, q) =
etr
−M−1
[
(zi¯ − βq)(z i¯ − βq)†+
∑
i∈Ω\{i¯}
(zi − βiq)(zi − βiq)†
]
(34)
Furthermore, it can be proved that
min
β
(z i¯ − βq)†M−1(z i¯ − βq)
= z†
i¯
M−1z i¯ −
z
†
i¯
M−1qq†M−1zi¯
q†M−1q
(35)
and
min
βi
∑
i∈Ω\{i¯}
(zi − βiq)†M−1(zi − βiq)
=
∑
i∈Ω\{i¯}
(
z
†
iM
−1zi − z
†
iM
−1qq†M−1zi
q†M−1q
)
. (36)
Thus, the maximization of w with respect to β and βi leads
to
max
β,βi,i∈Ω\{i¯},q
w(β, βi, i ∈ Ω \ {i¯}, q)
=max
q
exp
[
z
†
i¯
M−1qq†M−1zi¯
q†M−1q
− z†
i¯
M−1zi¯
+
∑
i∈Ω\{i¯}
(
z
†
iM
−1qq†M−1zi
q†M−1q
− z†iM−1zi
)
=max
q
exp
q
†M−1
[
z i¯z
†
i¯
+
∑
i∈Ω\{i¯} ziz
†
i
]
M−1q
q†M−1q
−
z†
i¯
M−1z i¯ +
∑
i∈Ω\{i¯}
z
†
iM
−1zi

=max
u
exp
u
†
[
xi¯x
†
i¯
+
∑
i∈Ω\{i¯} xix
†
i
]
u
u†u
−
x†
i¯
xi¯ +
∑
i∈Ω\{i¯}
x
†
ixi

=exp {λ1(S1)− Tr (S1)} (37)
where S1 = xi¯x
†
i¯
+
∑
i∈Ω\{i¯} xix
†
i and we used the Rayleigh-
Ritz theorem [26]. We also recall that xi = M
−1/2zi and
u =M−1/2q.
Thus, we conclude that the compressed likelihood underH0
is given by
max
β,βi,i∈Ω\{i¯},q
L0(β, βi, i ∈ Ω \ {i¯},M , q)
=
1
[πN det(M )]
H
exp {λ1 (S1)− Tr (S1)} . (38)
As far the maximization of the likelihood function under H1
is concerned, we first focus on α and observe that
min
α
(
(z i¯ − αv − βq)†M−1(z i¯ − αv − βq)
)
= (zi¯ − βq)†M−1(z i¯ − βq)
− (z i¯ − βq)
†M−1vv†M−1(z i¯ − βq)
v†M−1v
.
(39)
Thus, it turns out that
max
α
L1(α, β, βi, i ∈ Ω \ {i¯},M , q) = 1
[πN det(M )]
H
× exp
{
(zi¯ − βq)†M−1vv†M−1(zi¯ − βq)
v†M−1v
−(z i¯ − βq)†M−1(zi¯ − βq)
−
∑
i∈Ω\{i¯}
(zi − βiq)†M−1(zi − βiq)
 . (40)
To the best of authors’ knowledge maximization of (40) with
respect to the remaining parameters cannot be conducted in
closed form. For this reason, we exploit another alternating
7optimization procedure. To this end, we first re-write the
partially-compressed likelihood as
max
α
L1(α, β, βi, i ∈ Ω \ {i¯},M , q)
=
1
[πN det(M )]
H
exp [−h (u, β, βi, i ∈ Ω \ {i¯})] (41)
with
h (u, β, βi, i ∈ Ω \ {i¯})
= (xi¯ − βu)†P⊥v0 (xi¯ − βu) +
∑
i∈Ω\{i¯}
(xi − βiu)† (xi − βiu)
(42)
where
P⊥v0 = I −
v0v
†
0
v
†
0v0
, (43)
and, for the reader ease, we recall that u = M−1/2q, xi =
M−1/2zi, xi¯ =M
−1/2z i¯, and v0 =M
−1/2v.
Then, assuming that β = β(n) and βi = β
(n)
i are given, we
can focus on the maximization with respect to q. To this end,
setting to zero the first derivative3 of
h
(
u, β(n), β
(n)
i , i ∈ Ω \ {i¯}
)
with respect to u leads to
− β(n)∗P⊥v0xi¯ +
∣∣∣β(n)∣∣∣2 P⊥v0u
−
∑
i∈Ω\{i¯}
β
(n)
i
∗
xi +
∑
i∈Ω\{i¯}
∣∣∣β(n)i ∣∣∣2 u = 0; (45)
then
u(n) =argmin
u
{
h
(
u, β(n), β
(n)
i , i ∈ Ω \ {i¯}
)}
=
∣∣∣β(n)∣∣∣2P⊥v0 + ∑
i∈Ω\{i¯}
∣∣∣β(n)i ∣∣∣2 I
−1
β(n)∗P⊥v0xi¯ + ∑
i∈Ω\{i¯}
β
(n)
i
∗
xi
 . (46)
On the other hand, we can estimate β(n+1) and β
(n+1)
i ,
given u(n), exploiting a standard least-squares result, i.e.,[
β(n+1)
β
(n+1)
i
]
= argmax
β,βi
{
exp
[
−h
(
u(n), β, βi, i ∈ Ω \ {i¯}
)]}
=

u(n)
†
P⊥v0xi¯
u(n)
†
P⊥v0u
(n)
u(n)
†
xi
u(n)
†
u(n)
 . (47)
The iterative procedure starts by replacing u(0) with a nor-
malized steering vector from the sidelobes. Moreover, as for
3Wemake use of the following definition for the derivative of a real function
f(α) with respect to the complex argument α = αr + jαi, αr , αi ∈ R,
[27]
∂f(α)
∂α
=
1
2
[
∂f(α)
∂αr
− j
∂f(α)
∂αi
]
. (44)
R-NCP-D, we stop alternating after a preassigned number of
iterations.
Finally, replacing M with the sample covariance matrix
based upon the secondary data, we come up with an adaptive
detector referred to in the following as deterministic NCP
detector (D-NCP-D).
IV. PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
The aim of this section is to investigate the performance of
the proposed algorithms in terms of probability of detection
(Pd). To this end, we resort to standard Monte Carlo counting
techniques by evaluating the thresholds to ensure a preassigned
Pfa and the Pd curves over 100/Pfa and 1000 independent
trials, respectively. Data are generated according to the model
defined in problem (1), where
M = σ2nIN + pcM c. (48)
In (48), σ2nIN represents the thermal noise component with
power σ2n while pcM c is the clutter component with pc the
clutter power and M c the structure of the clutter covariance
matrix; the clutter-to-noise ratio (CNR) is thus given by
CNR = pc/σ
2
n.
In the following, we set σ2n = 1, CNR = 20 dB, and
M c(i, j) = ρ
|i−j| with ρ = 0.9 (recall that M c(i, j) is
the (i, j)th entry of M c). Moreover, we suppose that the
victim radar is equipped with a uniformly-spaced linear array
(ULA) of N identical and isotropic sensors with inter-element
distance equal to λ/2, λ being the wavelength corresponding
to the carrier frequency of the NCP (modeled as a narrowband
plane wave) impinging onto the antenna array. The target
response is computed according to the signal-to-clutter-plus-
noise ratio (SCNR), whose expression is
SCNR = |α|2 v(0)†M−1v(0). (49)
As for the NCP, we assume that, when it is present, it enters the
antenna array response of the victim radar from the sidelobes
with a power pj such that the jammer-to-noise ratio (JNR),
defined as JNR = pj/σ
2
n, is 30 dB. In order to select the
amount of primary data, we consider system parameter values
of practical interest, namely we assume that the radar system
transmits a linear frequency modulated pulse of duration 3 µs
and bandwidth 5 MHz. Now, since the rate at which the range
bins are generated is 2 · 10−7 s, then the uncompressed pulse
covers 15 range bins. Using 5 additional guard cells, we set
H1 = H2 = 10. For the reader ease, all the simulation
parameters are summarized in Table I.
Finally, for comparison purposes, we also report the Pd
curves of the subspace detector proposed in [28] and the
adaptive matched filter (AMF) [29]. As a matter of fact, the
AMF raises from a suitable modification of the derivation
contained in Subsection III-B, which consists in forcing the
constraint q†M−1v = 0 as shown in the appendix4. The
curves for the likelihood ratio test with known parameters,
4Recall from Table I that the jammer is located at 35◦ with respect to the
array normal, leading to cos(θjt) = 0.07 for N = 8 and cos(θjt) = 0.03
for N = 16, where θjt is the angle between target and jammer steering
vectors in the whitened observation space.
8referred to as clairvoyant detector (CD), are also included since
they represent an upper bound to the detection performance.
In the next subsection, we focus on the stopping criterion
and provide suitable numerical examples aimed at establishing
a reasonable iteration number for both cyclic optimization
procedures.
A. Selection of the maximum number of iterations
The detection performance, assessed in Subsection IV-B,
are obtained using a preassigned number of iterations. Now,
in order to select this value, in Figures 3 and 4, we show
the average norm of the difference between the estimates at
the nth iteration and their respective values at the (n − 1)th
iteration. The averages are evaluated over 1000 independent
Monte Carlo trials assuming N = 8, K = 12, and SCNR= 20
dB. In both cases we model q as a narrowband plane wave
impinging onto the antenna array from a direction whose
azimuth, generated at random at each Monte Carlo trial, is
uniformly distributed outside the antenna mainlobe. Inspection
of the figures highlights that 10 iterations for each procedure
ensure a variation of the estimated quantities less than or
equal to 10−5 and also represent a good compromise from the
computational point of view. For this reason, in what follows
we adopt this number for the computation of the Pd curves.
B. Detection Performance
In this subsection, we investigate the behavior of the pro-
posed architectures in terms of Pd versus the SCNR for two
different scenarios, which are complementary. Specifically, the
former assumes a jammer illuminating the victim radar from
its sidelobes, whereas the latter consider a surveillance area
free of intentional interferers. It is important to underline that
the second case does not correspond to the design assumptions.
Figures 5-7 refer to the first scenario assuming N = 8
and different values for K . The common denominator of
these figures is that R-NCP-D and D-NCP-D share the same
performance, since the respective curves are overlapped, and
outperform the remaining architectures except for the CD (as
expected). The gain of the R-NCP-D and D-NCP-D over the
SD is about 10 dB at Pd = 0.9. On the other hand, the AMF
has the worst performance with a loss at Pd = 0.9 ranging
from about 7 dB for K = 12 to about 4 dB for K = 24 with
respect to the SD. Comparison of the figures also points out
that the Pd curves move towards left as K increases, which
means that the Pd is an increasing function of K given the
SCNR. Finally, the loss at Pd = 0.9 of the R-NCP-D/D-NCP-
D with respect to the CD halves when K goes from K = 12,
which corresponds to a loss of about 8 dB, to K = 24, which
results in a loss of about 4 dB.
The second scenario is accounted for in Figures 8-10,
which assume the same parameter setting as previous figures
except for the presence of the jammer. In this case, the
curves of R-NCP-D and D-NCP-D are no longer overlapped
and, more important, the latter does not achieve Pd = 1
at least for the considered parameter values. The R-NCP-D
continues to provide satisfactory performance outperforming
the other counterparts. In fact, the comparison with previous
figures highlights that the performance of R-NCP-D keeps
more or less unaltered. On the other hand, for the considered
parameter values (and the considered scenario), the SD is
completely useless since the resulting Pd values are close to
zero, while the AMF improves significantly its performance
as K increases ensuring about the same Pd values of the R-
NCP-D for K = 3N .
Finally, the comparison between Figure 11 and Figure 6
allows to appreciate the performance variations due to both N
and K when their ratio is constant. In fact, Figure 11 assumes
N = 16 and K = 32, namely twice the analogous values of
Figure 6. It can be noted that R-NCP-D, D-NCP-D, and AMF
provides higher Pd values than those of Figure 6, whereas
the performance of SD seems insensitive to the considered
parameter change.
Summarizing, the above analysis singles out the R-NCP-
D as an effective mean to face attacks of smart NLJs which
transmit noise-like signals to cover the skin echoes from the
platform under protection. As a matter of fact, the R-NCP-D
outperforms all the other competitors either in the presence or
absence of a noise cover pulse.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, two new detection architectures to account
for possible NCP attacks have been proposed and assessed.
Specifically, the first approach consists in modeling the NLJ
contribution as a covariance component, while the second
solution considers the realizations of the NLJ and handles
them as deterministic signals. Then, ad hoc modifications
of the GLRT have been devised for both scenarios where
the unknown parameters are computed through alternating
estimation procedures. The behavior of the two architectures
has been first investigated resorting to simulated data adhering
the design assumptions of the first approach and, then, they
have been tested on data where the NCP is turned off. The
analysis has singled out the R-NCP-D obtained with the first
approach as the recommended solution for adaptive detection
in the presence of clutter and NCP, since it can guarantee
satisfactory performance in both the considered situations.
Finally, future research tracks might encompass the appli-
cation of the herein presented approach to the case of range-
spread targets possibly embedded in non-Gaussian clutter.
APPENDIX A
ALTERNATIVE DERIVATION OF THE AMF
In this Appendix, we modify the derivation contained in
Subsection III-B by imposing the constraint u†v0 = 0, namely
the target steering vector and the NCP signature are orthogonal
in the whitened space. For the reader convenience, let us recall
that u = M−1/2q, S1 =
[
xi¯x
†
i¯
+
∑
i∈Ω\{i¯} xix
†
i
]
, v0 =
M−1/2v, xi =M−1/2zi, xi¯ =M
−1/2z i¯.
Now, under H0, the maximization with respect to β and
βi of w (given by (34)) leads to (35) and (36), respectively.
Thus, assuming the orthogonality constraint, it is possible to
reformulate the maximization of w with respect to u as
max
u:u†v0=0
exp
{
u†S1u
u†u
− Tr [S1]
}
. (50)
9Let U ∈ CN×N−1 be a slice of unitary matrix, namely
U †U = IN−1, with columns forming a basis for the orthog-
onal complement of the subspace spanned by v0. Given the
orthogonality constraint, it follows that u can be expressed
in terms of a linear combination of the columns of U , i.e.,
u = Uγ with γ ∈ C(N−1)×1 the coordinate vector. Then,
maximization (50) can be recast as
max
u:u†v0=0
exp
{
u†S1u
u†u
− Tr [S1]
}
= exp
{
max
γ
γ†U †S1Uγ
γ†γ
− Tr [S1]
}
= exp
{
λ1
(
U †S1U
)
− Tr [S1]
}
, (51)
where the last equality is due to the Rayleigh Ritz theorem
[26]. Thus, the solution to the constrained optimization prob-
lem, under H0, is
max
β,βi,i∈Ω\{i¯},q
L0(β, βi, i ∈ Ω \ {i¯},M , q)
=
1
[πN det (M)]
H
exp
{
λ1
(
U †S1U
)
− Tr [S1]
}
. (52)
On the other hand, under H1, we can start from the partially-
compressed likelihood with respect to α, given by (41). In fact,
it is possible to show that, after optimization of the likelihood
function with respect to α, β, and βi, we obtain
max
α,β,βi,i∈Ω\{i¯},q
L1(α, β, βi, i ∈ Ω \ {i¯},M , q)
=
1
[πN det (M )]
H
exp
{
u†P⊥v0xi¯x
†
i¯
P⊥v0u
u†P⊥v0u
+
∑
i∈Ω\{i¯}
x
†
iuu
†xi
u†u
−
x†
i¯
P⊥v0xi¯ +
∑
i∈Ω\{i¯}
x
†
ixi

=
1
[πN det (M )]
H
exp
u†S1uu†u −
x†
i¯
P⊥v0xi¯ +
∑
i∈Ω\{i¯}
x
†
ixi

(53)
where the last equality comes from the orthogonality condition
between u and v0. Thus, it follows that
max
u:u†v0=0
max
α,β,βi,i∈Ω\{i¯},q
L1(α, β, βi, i ∈ Ω \ {i¯},M , q)
=
1
[πN det (M)]
H
× exp
λ1(U †S1U)−
x†
i¯
P⊥v0xi¯ +
∑
i∈Ω\{i¯}
x
†
ixi

(54)
where, again, the last equality comes from [26]. The final
expression for the constrained GLRT-based architecture is
obtained combining (52) and (54). Precisely, taking the log-
likelihoods, the “constrained test (33)” is statistically equiva-
lent to
x
†
i¯
P v0xi¯
H1
>
<
H0
η, (55)
whose decision statistic, after replacing M with the sample
covariance matrix based on secondary data, coincides with that
of the AMF.
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Received echoes in the presence of NCP
Fig. 1. Operating principle of NCP.
Fig. 2. Range bins partitioning.
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS SETUP
Symbol Value Description
N 8,16 Number of antennas
H1 10 Number of contaminated cells
on the left of the CUT
H2 10 Number of contaminated cells
on the right of the CUT
CNR 20 dB Clutter-to-Noise Ratio
JNR 30 dB Jammer-to-Noise Ratio
θj 35
◦ Angle Of Arrival (AOA) of the NCP jammer
Pfa 10
−4 False Alarm probability
NMC 10
3 Number of independent trials
to evaluate the probability of detection Pd
2 4 6 8 10 12
10−10
100
1010
|α(n)−α(n−1)|
Number of iterations
2 4 6 8 10 12
10−10
100
1010
|p(n)−p(n−1)|
Number of iterations
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10−10
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|| u0(n)− u0(n−1)||
Number of iterations
Fig. 3. Euclidean norm (or modulus) of the difference between the estimates
at the nth iteration and those at the (n− 1)th iteration versus the number of
iterations for cyclic optimization of Subsection III-A.
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Fig. 4. Euclidean norm (or modulus) of the difference between the estimates
at the nth iteration and those at the (n− 1)th iteration versus the number of
iterations for cyclic optimization of Subsection III-B.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
SCNR (dB)
P d
 
 
CD
R−NCP−D
AMF
D−NCP−D
SD
Fig. 5. Pd versus SCNR for the CD, R-NCP-D, AMF, D-NCP-D, and the
SD assuming N = 8, K = 12, and a jammer at 35◦ .
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Fig. 6. Pd versus SCNR for the CD, R-NCP-D, AMF, D-NCP-D, and the
SD assuming N = 8, K = 16, and a jammer at 35◦.
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Fig. 7. Pd versus SCNR for the CD, R-NCP-D, AMF, D-NCP-D, and the
SD assuming N = 8, K = 24, and a jammer at 35◦.
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Fig. 8. Pd versus SCNR for the CD, R-NCP-D, AMF, D-NCP-D, and the
SD assuming N = 8, K = 12, and no jammers.
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Fig. 9. Pd versus SCNR for the CD, R-NCP-D, AMF, D-NCP-D, and the
SD assuming N = 8, K = 16, and no jammers.
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Fig. 10. Pd versus SCNR for the CD, R-NCP-D, AMF, D-NCP-D, and the
SD assuming N = 8, K = 24, and no jammers.
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Fig. 11. Pd versus SCNR for the CD, R-NCP-D, AMF, D-NCP-D, and the
SD assuming N = 16, K = 32, and a jammer at 35◦.
